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ABSTRACT
We investigate the relationship between foreclosure activity and the health of residents using zip code
level longitudinal data. We focus on Arizona, California, Florida, and New Jersey, four states that
have been among the hardest hit by the foreclosure crisis. We combine foreclosure data for 2005 to
2009 from RealtyTrac with data on emergency room visits and hospital discharges.  Our zip code level
quarterly data allow us to control for many potential confounding factors through the inclusion of fixed
effects for each zip code as well as for each combination of county, quarter, and year.  We find that
an increase in the number of foreclosures is associated with increases in medical visits for mental health
(anxiety and suicide attempts), for preventable conditions (such as hypertension), and for a broad array
of physical complaints that are plausibly stress-related.  They are not related to visits for cancer morbidity,
which arguably should not respond as rapidly to stress.  Foreclosures also have a zero or negative effect
on elective procedures, as one might expect.  Age specific results suggest that the foreclosure crisis
is having its most harmful effects on individuals 20 to 49.  We also find that larger effects for African-Americans


















The expansion of mortgage credit over the last decade was followed by a sharp decline in 
housing prices, which has caused foreclosure rates to reach historically high levels in the United 
States.  According to Realtytrac, a leading firm that monitors and markets foreclosed homes, a 
record 2.82 million homes faced foreclosure in 2009, a 21 percent rise from 2008 and a huge 120 
percent jump from 2007.
1   One in 45 homes (2.23 percent of all housing units in the U.S.) 
received at least one foreclosure filing during 2010.  As policymakers have debated measures to 
stabilize the housing market and minimize the damage to the U.S. economy, researchers have 
turned their attention to understanding the consequences of rising foreclosures.   
While a number of studies have investigated the effect of the foreclosure crisis on 
outcomes such as home prices and sales, residential investment, and durable consumption (e.g., 
Immergluck and Smith, 2006; Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles, 2008; Rogers and Winter, 2009; 
Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao, 2009; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi, 2010), there has been no large-scale 
investigation of the effect of the crisis on health.  The foreclosure crisis represents a large shock 
to the financial well-being of many households, reaching beyond those that actually suffered 
foreclosure through its effects on housing values, and thus provides a fresh opportunity to 
examine the relationship between financial distress and health. 
Foreclosures might be expected to influence health through several channels  First, for the 
individuals directly involved, a home foreclosure is often an intensely stressful life event. 
Second, a high rate of foreclosure in a neighborhood may have negative impacts on those who do 
not lose their homes as homeowners see the value of their properties fall (Lin, Rosenblatt, and 
Yao, 2009; Immergluck and Smith, 2006; Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi, 2011).  Third, financial 
                                                           




problems and stress may cause changes in health behaviors, which in turn may have negative 
health consequences.  For example, people may smoke or drink more, stop taking medications 
because they cannot afford them, or stop going to the doctor for preventive care.    
The goal of this paper is to investigate whether the foreclosure crisis is having an adverse 
effect on health.   In order to investigate these health effects, we assemble quarterly data on all 
foreclosures, Emergency Room (ER) visits, and hospitalizations from four states (Arizona, 
California, Florida, and New Jersey) which are among the 10 states that have been hardest hit by 
the crisis.  Data on foreclosure activity is linked to data on ER visits and hospital discharges at 
the zip code level.   We control for zip code fixed effects so that our effects are identified by 
changes within zip codes (rather than comparisons of, for example, rich and poor 
neighborhoods).  We also control for interactions of county, quarter, and year in order to account 
for time-varying features of local labor markets such as unemployment rates.    Hence, we take 
advantage of the fact that some zip codes were much more heavily impacted than others even 
within a county.   We focus on conditions that are likely to be impacted by stress (such as heart 
attack and stroke) and examine cancer as a “control” condition that takes many years to develop 
and is less likely to be impacted by stress in the shorter term. 
We find considerable evidence of an increase in non-elective (i.e. urgent and unscheduled) 
hospital and ER visits for stress-related conditions but not for cancer.   Foreclosure is associated 
with significant increases in suicide attempts, heart attacks, and stroke, diagnoses that are not usually 
treated in an outpatient setting, suggesting that the increase cannot be explained by people switching 
providers.   Foreclosure is also associated with increases in urgent, unscheduled visits for conditions 
such as gastro-intestinal problems, and heart problems such as chest pain and dysrhythmias.   These 
effects are particularly pronounced for Hispanics, though we find the largest estimated effects on heart 5 
 
attack and stroke among blacks.   We also find large increases in hospitalizations for conditions that 
are “Prevention Quality Indicators,” (PQIs) i.e. conditions which should not result in hospital or 
ER visits if patients receive proper preventive care.  For example, an increase of 100 foreclosures, 
which is approximately the increase experienced in the average zip code in our sample, raises 
admissions for preventable hospitalizations by 6.3 percent among 50-64 year olds.   These results 
suggest that some of the increase in visits is caused by people cutting back on preventive care.  The 
effects of foreclosure are generally smaller for those who are insured, suggesting that cut backs in 
medical care may be an important pathway for the health effects of foreclosure.   
    An increase in visits in zip codes that experience a run up in foreclosures does not 
necessarily indicate that people are becoming sicker because of the foreclosure crisis.  Therefore, 
we consider and reject a number of other possible explanations for this relationship.  
Specifically, we show that the estimated effects cannot be completely accounted for by 
increasing unemployment; we find similar effects over the 2005-2007 period, before the run up 
in unemployment, and in county-level models in which we control for the unemployment rate.  
Nor, as discussed above, can the results be explained by people switching from out-patient to 
hospital providers.   Since people who have suffered foreclosure are likely to leave their old 
neighborhoods, we believe that the increases in visits primarily reflect the effects of financial and 
psychological distress precipitated by the foreclosure crisis on those who remain.   
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows.  In Section II, we provide some background 
information about the foreclosure crisis, and previous work on the relationship between economic 
activity and health.  We then discuss our data in Section III and methods in Section IV, followed 




There have been several explanations offered for the foreclosure crisis including a 
relaxation in underwriting standards and the expansion of mortgage credit to subprime borrowers 
(e.g., U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2009;  Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven, 
2008; Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011), mortgage securitization having an adverse effect on the 
screening practices of lenders (e.g., Keys et al., 2010), widespread negative equity caused by the 
willingness of mortgage lenders to issue mortgage-debt on homes in which the owners had little 
or no equity (e.g., Gerardi, Ross, and Willen, 2009,  2011), and a rapid increase in interest rates 
after a period of historically low levels that fueled a housing bubble (e.g., Mayer and Hubbard, 
2008).Whatever the root causes might be, delinquencies and foreclosures soared starting in late 
2006, and housing prices plummeted (Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak, 2009; Calomiris, Longhofer, 
and Miles, 2008, Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao, 2009, Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao, 2009; 
Immergluck and Smith, 2006).  The turmoil in the housing market spread to capital markets and 
generated the current continuing economic malaise (e.g., Green, 1997; Leamer, 2007; Gauger and 
Snyder, 2003). 
 
a)  How Could Foreclosures Affect Health? 
The implications of the crisis for non-economic domains such as health have been largely 
ignored.
2  Yet there are good reasons to expect the foreclosure crisis to impact health.  First, 
foreclosure represents a potentially extremely stressful experience as well as the culmination of a 
stressful process for the affected homeowner.   Stress is hypothesized to affect health both by 
depressing the immune system and making a person more susceptible to infection, and through 
                                                           
2 Bennett, Scharoun-Lee, and Tucker-Seeley (2009) point to the urgent need for credible research 
investigating the health effects of foreclosures. 
 7 
 
the direct action of “stress hormones” on factors such as blood pressure and cardiovascular 
health (McEwen, 1998a, 1998b).    A growing literature suggests that stress can have harmful 
consequences through psychological responses such as depression or higher levels of hormones 
such as cortisol, and that stressful life experiences are associated with both physical and mental 
illnesses (Goldberger and Breznitz, 1993; McEwen, 1998a, 1998b; Cooper, 2005; Schneiderman, 
Ironson, and Siegel, 2005).  Hence, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the stress associated 
with foreclosure might have negative effects on human health. 
  However, the available data are not well suited to examining the effects of experiencing 
foreclosure on an individual’s health.   Those who lose their homes to foreclosure are likely to 
move at some point during the process, and there is no available data that would allow 
researchers to track large number of these individuals to their new locations and assess their 
health before and after foreclosure.  What we can do is to use the available data to examine the 
effects of high levels of foreclosure activity on those who remain in a neighborhood, whether or 
not they personally experienced foreclosure.  
High levels of foreclosure in a neighborhood may affect health because housing is the 
major source of wealth for most people.  Therefore, declines in housing prices represent a 
significant negative shock to wealth, not just for those who suffer foreclosure, but also for their 
neighbors.
3   Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2011) conclude that a one standard deviation increase in 
foreclosures in a zip code results in a growth rate in housing prices that is two-thirds of a 
standard deviation lower.  
 Bajari, Chu, and Park (2008) consider two broad categories of defaults.  Defaults in the 
                                                           
3 Similarly, there is a positive association between health and home ownership, presumably because home 




first category include homeowners who rationally decide to “walk away” from a mortgage when 
it is no longer in their interest to pay for it.   For example, a buyer with a negligible down 
payment might be substantially better off walking away from a mortgage in response to falling 
housing prices.  The second category includes borrowers who lose their homes due to short-term 
liquidity constraints.  These borrowers might have been particularly adversely affected by the 
credit freeze and by interest rate “resets” that suddenly increased their monthly payments.  Bajari 
et al. conclude that short-term credit constraints at least as important as the decline in housing 
prices in explaining the increase in defaults.   For every household who lost a home, there were 
likely to be many more who were struggling with these credit constraints. 
Several studies have linked economic crisis to reductions in the utilization of medical care 
(e.g., Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano, 2010; Williams and Collins, 1995; Feinstein, 1993).   As 
we will see below, foreclosures are linked to increases in preventable hospitalizations and ER 
room visits suggesting that people are constrained in terms of their medical expenditures.  It is 
also possible that people smoke or drink more (though they could also reduce consumption in 
response to financial constraints), consume a lower quality diet, or get less exercise when they 
are financially strapped. 
It is of course possible for health problems to cause foreclosure in individual cases.
4  For 
example, Warren et al. (2007) argue that many bankruptcies are caused by ill health.  Pollack and 
Lynch (2009) compare individuals who voluntarily enrolled in mortgage counseling in Philadelphia 
with respondents of a community health survey in Pennsylvania between July and October 2008.  
The foreclosure sample was significantly more likely to have hypertension, heart disease, or 
psychiatric disorders than the community sample.  However, in their sample foreclosure may 
                                                           




indeed be caused by poor health rather than vice-versa since over a quarter of their foreclosure 
group owed money to medical creditors.  Moreover, Philadelphia has not been particularly hard 
hit by foreclosure, ranking 77
th among metropolitan areas in terms of foreclosures in 2008, 
suggesting that their sample of mortgage counselees might have been negatively selected 
relatively to those suffering foreclosure in areas that have been more strongly impacted.    
In contrast, the foreclosure crisis examined here represents a sudden and sharp shock to 
wealth that is unlikely to have been caused by a sudden epidemic of ill health among the U.S. 
population.   Moreover, while in hindsight many commentators have said that a crash was 
inevitable, the timing and severity of it were certainly a surprise to almost all observers   (Mian 
and Sufi, 2010; Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles, 2008; Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011). In 
fact, it is this feature of the foreclosure crisis that presents a unique opportunity to explore the 
consequences of foreclosure on health.  There is no reason to suppose that the spike in 
foreclosures was caused by the health problems of individual homeowners, and the overall 
relationship between the increase in foreclosures and increased health problems is likely to 
represent a relationship running from foreclosure to health rather than vice versa. 
 
b)  Effects of Unemployment on Health 
While the health effects of foreclosure have been ignored, there is an extensive and related 
literature examining the effects of unemployment and job loss on health.  Ruhm (2000, 2003, 2006), 
Ruhm and Black (2002), Neumayer (2004),  and Gerdtham and Ruhm (2006) find that higher 
unemployment is associated with lower mortality rates, while Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) 
find that higher unemployment improves infant health.  These patterns have been attributed to 
recession-induced changes in health behaviors, though the evidence on this channel is mixed.  10 
 
For example, Xu and Kaestner (2010) study a group of low income individuals and find that 
higher employment is associated with more cigarette smoking and fewer visits to doctors for 
preventive care.   However, Deb et al. (2011) examine a sample of older workers and find that 
some of them experience increases in body mass index and alcohol consumption in response to 
job loss.   Miller et al. (2009) argue that the cyclical changes in mortality are concentrated in the 
young and the old and so are unlikely to represent changes in health behaviors among working 
age adults. 
Sullivan and Wachter (2009) follow a large sample of individuals who lost their jobs in 
mass layoffs.  They find significantly higher death rates due to accidents and heart conditions in 
this group, both immediately and in the longer term.  Eliason and Storrie (2009a) examine data 
from plant closings in Sweden in 1987 and 1988 and find that mortality rises by 44 percent in the 
four years following job loss.  In particular, they find a two-fold increase in suicide.  Eliason and 
Storrie (2009b) also find increases in hospitalizations due to self harm, accidents, and alcohol-
related causes in the 12 years following displacement.  However, Browning et al. (2006) 
examine the effects of job loss in a 10 percent sample of the population of Denmark and find no 
effect on hospitalizations for circulatory or digestive ailments.  
 While foreclosure and unemployment may both be viewed as negative economic shocks, they 
differ in key respects:  Foreclosure does not entail increases in leisure, and unemployment does not 
generally have spillovers in terms of other peoples’ wealth (though a mass layoff might).  Still, the 
literature on unemployment and health is relevant for two reasons.  First, while it is somewhat 
inconclusive, on the whole it suggests that economic shocks can have health effects.  Second, the 
foreclosure crisis has been followed by the worst recession since the Great Depression.  Hence, it is 
reasonable to wonder whether the health effects that we find are due to unemployment rather than 11 
 
foreclosure.  Figure 1 shows that the rise in foreclosures preceded the increase in unemployment in our 
study states, and one way we will try to distinguish between the effects of unemployment and the effects of 
foreclosure is by conducting sub-analyses on the period 2005-2007 when unemployment was constant or 
falling and foreclosures were rising.  We also show that county-level models that control for 
unemployment directly produce very similar estimates of the effects of foreclosure.   
 
c)  Potential Differences in Effects by Race, Ethnicity and Age 
Minority groups are thought to have been particularly hit hard by the foreclosure crisis 
(Rugh and Massey, 2010) in part because  lending agencies targeted low-income minority 
neighborhoods for risky loans  (Avery, Brevoort, and Canner, 2007; Bocian, Ernst, and Li, 2008; 
Calem, Gillen, and Wachter, 2004; Mayer and Pence, 2008; Squires, 2008).  These groups may also 
have had a more difficult time with the crisis given lower savings, poorer labor market prospects, 
lower rates of private health insurance coverage, and poorer baseline health than other groups.   
Bowdler, Quercia, and Smith (2010) argue that Latinos have been particularly strongly affected, 
which is provocative in light of the strong health effects we find for Hispanics.   
The effects of foreclosures on health might also be expected to vary by age.  While 
overall levels of financial literacy are poor (e.g., Lusardi and Tufano, 2009), financial decision 
making usually improves with age (e.g. Agarwal et al., 2007) and older people are less likely to 
borrow on the equity in their homes (e.g., Duca and Kumar, 2010).  But there is also some 
evidence that senior citizens were disproportionately targeted by lenders for predatory lending 
purposes (Government Accountability Office, 2004; Delgadillo, Erickson, and Piercy, 2008; 
Collins, 2009).  Cunningham and Capone (1990) and Anderson and VanderHoff (1999) find that 
foreclosure rates decrease with age, but these studies are based on data at least 20 years of age.  12 
 
Ludy and Herlitz (2009) note that the largest increases in homeownership from 1995 to 2004 
were among those aged between 20 and 44.  Perhaps the most useful study is by Shelton (2008) 
who analyzed a random sample of 2.5 million persons from Experian, the credit rating agency. 
She finds that three quarters of foreclosures in the second half of 2007 were among homeowners 
aged less than 50.  These figures suggest that the effects of foreclosure may be stronger among 
younger individuals, and perhaps among children since most parents are in this age range.  
Below we provide additional insight into these patterns using nationally representative data from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
 
d)  Summary 
The previous literature has largely ignored the possible relationship between the 
foreclosure crisis and population health, though it does suggest that such a relationship could exist.  
Ours is the first comprehensive effort to consider this potential relationship.  As such, the 
findings from this paper constitute an important baseline for future research by providing 
estimates of the impact of foreclosures on a range of important health problems.   Our paper also 
makes a contribution to the broader literature on the relationship between wealth and health.  By 
focusing on the foreclosure crisis, we limit the potential bias due to reverse causality that plagues 
most studies of this relationship.   
 
III. Data 
a) Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
While our main focus is on the relationship between foreclosure and visits to hospitals 
and emergency  rooms in  four large states,  it is helpful  to  motivate our study by examining 13 
 
nationally representative data on the characteristics of those suffering foreclosure and on the 
relationship between foreclosure and health from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID).
5  
The PSID administered a supplement on Housing Distress and Mortgages in 2009 which 
included questions about the family's foreclosure history over the past decade.  First, the 
household is asked whether they are currently in foreclosure on a first or second mortgage.  If the 
answer to this question is yes, the month and year the foreclosure was initiated are determined.  
In addition, respondents are asked whether they ever lived in a home since 2001 in which a 
foreclosure was started, and if so, the month and year when the foreclosure started.  From these 
four questions, we build a foreclosure history for each household.
6  The PSID asks both general 
health questions and questions regarding specific conditions.  The most general question asks the 
respondent to rate his or her health on a 5 point scale from Excellent to Poor.  In addition, 
respondents are asked if a doctor has ever told them that they have a number of different specific 
health conditions.  Other pertinent health behavior questions include whether the household 
members smoke or drink. The PSID had 8,682 respondents in 2009, with 327 reporting a 
foreclosure start since 2001. 
  Table 1 provides an overview and an interesting starting point for our analysis.  The first 
two columns divide the sample into those who ever experienced foreclosure (since 2001) and all 
                                                           
5 The PSID is a biannual survey of American households conducted by the University of Michigan's 
Institute for Social Research since the 1968. It began with a sample of over 18,000 individuals living in 
about 5,000 families in the United States. Detailed information on the participants and their descendants 
has been collected on a wide range of domains including employment, income, and health. The survey 
was administered annually until 1997 and bi-annually since.   
6 Specifically, the four questions are: “Has your bank or lender started the process of foreclosing on your 
home?--First/Second Mortgage”.   “In what month and year did the foreclosure start? --First/Second 
Mortgage”.  “During the last 8 years, that is, since 2001, have you, or anyone in your family living there 
ever owned a home on which a foreclosure was started?” and “In what month and year did the foreclosure 




others.  The questions pertain to the household head.  Clearly, those who have suffered 
foreclosure are generally younger, with relatively few elderly people in that group.  Whites are 
under-represented in the ever foreclosure group, while blacks and Hispanics are over-
represented.  Those who have been foreclosed are somewhat less likely to be married, but more 
likely to have children under 18 in the household.  They are less likely than others to report 
excellent health, but only slightly more likely to report that their health is poor.  They are much 
more likely to smoke, but somewhat less likely to drink than others. 
  Turning to their health in 2009, since those who have been foreclosed are generally 
younger, it is perhaps unsurprising that they are less likely to have many types of chronic 
conditions than others.  Striking exceptions are that they are more likely to have had a heart 
attack, more likely to have diabetes, and more likely to have psychological problems.   
  The next four columns of the table look at foreclosure status in 2009.   A few points stand 
out:  First, one reason that the elderly respondents are less likely than others to be in foreclosure 
is that they are more likely to own their homes free and clear.  This finding suggests that while 
elderly people might be impacted by falling housing prices, they would not be as likely as 
younger households to suffer short-term credit constraints due to changes in the terms of a 
mortgage.  Second, while households with a head who is unemployed are disproportionately 
more likely than others to be in foreclosure, only 16 percent of those households currently in 
foreclosure have unemployed heads.  Hence, many employed people are also experiencing 
foreclosure, or living with the threat of foreclosure.  A third observation is that those who are 
currently in foreclosure report much worse health than others, and are more likely to have most 
types of chronic conditions.  15 
 
Of course this simple tabulation of means cannot resolve cause and effect, and the small 
numbers of foreclosures in the PSID makes it difficult to analyze the relationship between 
foreclosure and health in a multivariate model.  Hence, we turn to administrative hospital records 
for that analysis.      
 
b) Foreclosures, Hospitalizations and Emergency Room Visits 
We focus on the states of Arizona, California, Florida and New Jersey for several reasons.  
First, we wish to focus on states that have recently had extremely high levels of foreclosures. 
Together these four states comprised almost 50 percent of all the foreclosure filings in 2008 
(RealtyTrac Press Release, January 15, 2009).  They were all in the top 10 foreclosure states, 
posting the third, first, second, and tenth largest totals of foreclosures in the country in 2010, 
respectively.  Second, we wish to use hospital discharge and emergency room data for entire 
states, rather than from a sample of hospitals.
7   It is important to include ER visits in addition to 
hospitalizations, because financial constraints can affect whether the person first presents at the ER, 
as well as the probability that someone on the margin is admitted to hospital if they do appear at 
the ER.   These are the only states that provide public access to these kinds of data, and also 
release information about the patient’s zip code and/or county.  
Foreclosure data are available at the zip code level monthly between April 2005 through 
December 2009 from RealtyTrac.  RealtyTrac is a leading foreclosure monitoring and marketing 
company, which collects data from public records at the local level, which is where legal 
documents for foreclosures are recorded, posted, and published. With coverage that accounts for 
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to tell if changes in hospitalizations or ER visits at hospitals in the sample might be counter-balanced by 




more than 90 percent of the U.S. population, the RealtyTrac data have been widely used by the 
media as well as researchers studying foreclosures (e.g., Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi, 2011; 
Hernandez, 2009; Pettit et al., 2009; Gaffney, 2009). 
The foreclosure data includes information about both a notice of trustee sales (NTS) and/or a 
notice of foreclosure sale (NFS).  Following instructions from RealtyTrac, we construct measures 
of foreclosures as NTS+NFS.
8  The data also includes information about real-estate owned 
(REO) properties, which are properties that have gone back to the mortgage lender after an 
unsuccessful foreclosure auction, and remain unsold.  We include REOs as an additional control 
for neighborhood conditions and past foreclosure activity in our regressions.
9  
   We include two additional measures of local housing market conditions in some of our 
specifications.  Zip code level data on housing prices in each quarter come from Zillow. Zillow does 
not compile data for smaller zip codes so including this variable reduces our sample size by about a 
quarter.  Data on vacancies in each quarter come from the U.S. postal service.   The postal service 
asks mail carriers to report addresses that have been vacant 90 days or more.   These data do not 
start until the fourth quarter of 2005, so including them also causes some loss of data.  In practice, 
our measures of foreclosures and REOs account for most of the within-zip code variation in the 
Zillow housing price measure, suggesting that it provides little additional information.
10   
                                                           
8 A state generally has either NTS or NFS and this depends on whether the state uses a judicial or a non-
judicial process in foreclosures.  The main difference between a judicial process and a non-judicial 
process is that the former procedure requires court action on a foreclosed home.  In general, NTS is 
available only for non-judicial states, while NFS is only available for judicial states.  Some states use both 
procedures. Among our sample states, AZ and CA conduct both judicial and non-judicial foreclosures, 
while FL and NJ only conduct judicial foreclosures. 
9 Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2011) define foreclosures as NTS+NFS+REO.   However, since we use 
quarterly data, there is a possibility that the same property could be counted both as NTS or NFS and as 
REO.  Hence, to avoid double-counting, we include these measures separately.  
10 Specifically, if we estimate an equation similar to (1) below, where the dependent variable is housing 




Our health measures come from two databases collected by the Healthcare Cost and 
Utilization Project (HCUP), which services a family of health care databases developed through a 
Federal-State-Industry partnership and sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ).  The HCUP compiles these data from participating states and releases them in 
a standard form.
11  Data on ER visits comes from the State Emergency Department Databases 
(SEDD), which capture discharge information on all emergency department visits that do not 
result in an admission.  Hospitalization data come from the State Inpatient Databases (SID), 
which hold the universe of inpatient discharge abstracts.  In order for a discharge record to exist, 
the patient must have been admitted to hospital; hence the SID contains records of patients who 
require more intensive treatment or for whom treatment cannot be provided on an out-patient 
basis. The smallest level of geographic detail give both databases is the zip code.
12  
In order to match the hospitalization data and the foreclosure data, we calculate the total 
number of hospitalizations in each category for each zip code and quarter.  Similarly, we calculate 
the total number of foreclosures and REOs for each zip code and quarter.  We impute zeros for 
zip codes that appear in RealtyTrac but have no hospitalizations.  The result is a balanced panel of 
3,525 zip codes with 19 time periods for a total of 66,975 observations. 
In what follows, we devote most of our attention to a combined data set of ER visits that 
did not result in hospitalizations, plus all hospitalizations other than those for childbirth, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
11 Visit http://www.ahrq.gov/data/hcup/ for more information on HCUP databases. 
12 We restrict the sample to Zip Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) as these are the units reported by the 
Census.  Zip codes are constructed by the postal service and frequently change.  ZCTAs are 
constructed by Census and remain consistent between Censuses.  Using ZCTAs allows us to merge 
population estimates to our data. We drop about 10% of our sample that could not be matched to 
ZCTAs.  The final number of ZCTAs in our analysis sample is 3,525.  For ease of understanding we 




contraception, and abortion.    We excluded these procedures because we felt that fertility responses 
to foreclosure could be quite complex.  We treat ER visits and hospital admissions together, because 
wealth, demographic characteristics, or changes in health insurance status might be correlated with 
the decision to admit a patient presenting at the ER, at the margin.   
We also look separately at elective procedures (which never occur in ERs).  Elective 
procedures are coded by HCUP, and involve visits that are not urgent, not emergencies, and not 
trauma care.  Typically, these visits are scheduled.  To say that they are not urgent does not 
necessarily imply that they are unimportant.  Elective visits might include regularly scheduled 
visits for chemotherapy, for example.   However, patients have more discretion over the 
scheduling of elective visits and might decide to forego them or to stretch out the time between 
visits in response to financial constraints.   On the other hand, to the extent that the foreclosure 
crisis worsens people’s health, it might result in greater numbers of both scheduled and 
unscheduled visits.  Hence, the effects of the crisis on elective visits are ambiguous whereas the 
effects on non-elective visits should be positive. 
Figures 2 and 3 show changes in foreclosure rates and changes in non-elective visits (both 
hospitalizations and ER) for zip codes in New Jersey, one of our sample states.
13    Rates are 
calculated using zip code population data from the 2000 Census.  That is, these rates can be 
interpreted as the number of foreclosures or hospitalizations per person (rather than per property).  
We calculate the rates this way since we look at person-level medical data.  The figures show that 
there is considerable variation across zip codes in both types of changes.  They also suggest that 
areas that experienced the sharpest increases in foreclosures also tended to experience the largest 
increases in hospitalizations. 
                                                           




Table 2 shows means for all zip codes, as well as for those that were in the top and bottom 
fifths of the distribution of the rate of foreclosures in 2009.   While the average zip code in our 
sample had 90.8 foreclosures in 2009, zip codes in the top fifth had 201foreclosures compared to 
only 4.74 foreclosures in the least impacted zip codes.  The table shows that the number of 
foreclosures increased 15 fold in the most highly impacted zip codes, but less than 4 fold in the 
least impacted zip codes.  Housing prices also fell more precipitously in the most impacted zip 
codes, and vacancies soared.   
The ER and hospitalization data is explored in Table 3.  HCUP data sets classify diagnoses 
using a tool called Clinical Classification Software (CCS).
14  This software takes thousands of 
International Classification of Disease (ICD) codes and groups them into clinically meaningful 
categories.  We use the single level diagnosis codes, and group them into larger aggregates using 
information from the multi-level diagnosis codes.  For example, single codes 122 (Pneumonia), 
123 (Influenza), 124 (Acute and Chronic Tonsilitis), 125 (Acute Bronchitis), and 126 (other 
Upper Respiratory Tract Infections) are grouped together in a category we call “Upper 
Respiratory Tract Infections”.  More information about our aggregates is in the Appendix.  
An additional hospitalization category that we consider is an index of “Prevention Quality 
Indicators” (PQIs).  These indicators are published by the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ) and are based on ICD-9-CM diagnosis codes.  PQIs are index conditions for 
which good outpatient care can prevent the need for hospitalizations or ER visits, or for which 
early intervention can prevent complications or more severe diseases.  Hospitalizations and ER 
visits for many other conditions may also be preventable to some extent, but PQIs are those which 
can almost always be prevented with appropriate care.  To the extent that individuals stressed by 
                                                           




the foreclosure process have fewer preventive doctor visits, stop adhering to prescription 
medicine regimes, or reduce self care, underlying health problems may be exacerbated by 
foreclosure activity.   The PQI category includes short and long-term complications of diabetes, 
amputations due to diabetes, and uncontrolled diabetes, perforated appendix, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, hypertension, congestive heart failure, dehydration, bacterial pneumonia, 
urinary tract infection, angina without procedure, and adult asthma. 
The first column of Table 3 shows the number of hospitalizations of different types 
overall, while the second and third columns of Table 3 show types of visits for people in zip codes 
in the top and bottom fifths of foreclosure activity (as of 2009).   Comparing high and low 
foreclosure zip codes, we see that the former have about 45 percent more people and 45 percent more 
elective visits.  However, people in high foreclosure zip codes have more than twice as many non-
elective visits than those in low foreclosure zip codes and also have twice as many preventable visits.    
Turning to specific categories of visits, suicide attempts stand out since, while rare, they are 4.4 
times more prevalent in high foreclosure areas.   It is quite possible that the foreclosure crisis has 
had negative effects on mental health.  In related work, Deaton (2011) finds negative effects of 
the Lehman brother’s failure on self-reported stress and well-being.     
 
IV. Research Design and Methods 
We estimate a series of models that relate changes in the number of hospitalizations or ER 
visits at time t to the number of foreclosures and real-estate occupied homes at t-1.  Specifically, 
we estimate models of the form: 
(1)    Hzqt = α0 + α1Fzqt-1 + α2REOzqt-1 + µz + λcqt + εzqt, 
where Hzqt is one of our outcome measures  in zip code z in quarter q in year t.  The variables of 21 
 
interest in equation (1) are Fzqt-1, the number of foreclosures in the zip code last quarter and REOzqt-1, 
which represents the “overhang” of houses that have been foreclosed and remain unsold.     Neighborhoods 
with large numbers of foreclosed properties that have not been sold may be different than other 
neighborhoods with similar levels of foreclosure activity.   As noted above, homeowners who are foreclosed 
at t-1 may have left the area by time t.
15   Hence, equation (1) captures the effect of last quarter’s foreclosure 
auctions on those who remain in the neighborhood. 
Indicators for each zip code, µz, are included to control for any time-invariant zip code 
level factors that may be correlated with both foreclosures and health.  To adjust for correlations 
within a zip code, standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.  The unit of analysis in 
equation (1) is a zip code, quarter, and year.
16  The data is weighted using the zip code population 
for the relevant demographic group from the 2000 Census. 
The vector λcqt includes an indicator for each county, quarter, and year.  These indicators 
control for any time varying county level factors that are correlated with both foreclosures and 
health.  For example, they serve as controls for unemployment in a particular county, year, and 
quarter, as well as for seasonality in illness or in foreclosures which may be different in different 
areas.  The vector εzqt represents an idiosyncratic random error term.  
We estimate separate models by age, focusing on those aged 0 to 19, 20 to 49, 50 to 64, 
and aged 65 plus.   While people in different age groups may be differentially affected by the 
                                                           
15 Depending on the state, homeowners may stay in their homes some time after a foreclosure auction, but 
this is generally 30 days or less. 
16 Note that we have specified equation (1) in terms of levels.  It might be more natural to think of 
specifying the equation in terms of rates; that is, the rate of hospitalization would be regressed on the rate 
of foreclosures.  However, accurate data on population is only available at the zip code level from the 
decennial Census.  If the measure of population used to construct the rates is a constant, then equation (1) 
is equivalent to a model specified in rates (since both sides would be divided by the same constant to get 
the rate).  Moreover, including the zip code fixed effect accounts for the fact that some zip codes are 




foreclosure crisis, they also suffer from different types of medical conditions.  For example, 
people younger than age 50 have few heart attacks.  Those aged 65 and over also have public 
health insurance in the form of Medicare.   
We also estimate separate models by race and ethnicity.  Again, while there is good 
reason to suppose that minorities have been differentially affected by the foreclosure crisis, they 
may also differ in terms of the types of maladies they are prone to, and the probability of having 
health insurance.    
We will show robust and consistent evidence of a strong association between foreclosure 
and increases in visits.  However, to answer the question asked in the title of this paper, it is 
necessary to provide further insights into the mechanisms underlying this association.   
One possibility is that it is not foreclosure per se, but increases in unemployment that are 
driving the increases in hospitalizations and ER visits.   As discussed above, all our models 
control for county-level unemployment in each year and quarter by including the vector λcqt.  But 
unemployment may vary at the zip code level within counties, though official unemployment 
rates are not computed at the zip code level (and therefore no zip code level measure is available).  
However, while high levels of unemployment may be currently causing foreclosures (Schmidt, 
2011), this was not the case during much of our sample period.   
In order to focus on the role of foreclosure, we estimate models using only data from 
2005 to 2007, before the steep climb in unemployment began.   Second, we estimate models 
aggregated to the county level that include both foreclosures and the unemployment rate in order 
to compare the estimated effects at the same level of aggregation.   Third, we estimate our 
models for those with private health insurance, who should have been least affected by 
unemployment.   23 
 
A second possibility is that the foreclosure crisis is not making people sick, but only 
causing them to switch out of private doctor’s offices and into hospitals and emergency rooms.   
We address this issue in several ways.  First, we focus on non-elective visits, which are urgent 
and unscheduled.   Switching is likely to be more of an issue for elective visits.  Second, we 
examine specific conditions which are almost always treated in hospitals and emergency rooms 
rather than outpatient settings, including heart attack and stroke.  For these conditions, the 
possibility of “switching” is extremely limited.  Third, we look separately at patients who have 
private health insurance or Medicare and therefore have little need to switch venues (though it 
may be argued that the privately insured would like to avoid co-pays when financially strapped).  
Fourth, if our results were driven mainly by venue switching, then we would expect to see 
smaller estimates for minorities, since minorities are more likely to use hospitals and emergency 
rooms for primary care to begin with.  Instead, we find larger effects of foreclosure on visits for 
minorities.  Increases in hospital and emergency room visits for preventable conditions do 
suggest that people are cutting back on outpatient visits, but also suggest that this is having a 
real, negative impact on their health.   
   
V. Results 
Table 4 provides an overview of our results by age.   Each entry of the table is from a 
separate regression and shows the coefficients α1 on foreclosures and α2 on REOs in the last 
period.   These coefficients are not directly comparable between regressions given different 
baseline numbers of visits in each category and demographic group.  Hence, we also show the 
baseline number of visits, and the percent change in visits implied by the coefficient estimate. In 
the discussion below, we focus on the estimated effects of foreclosures.  The effects of REOs are 24 
 
generally of similar sign and slightly smaller in magnitude. If the coefficient α1 is statistically 
significant at least at the 95 percent level of confidence, then we show the implied percent 
change in bold type.   A comparison of the first and second columns shows that foreclosure had 
relatively little impact on elective procedures compared to its impact on non-elective procedures.  
There are large and statistically significant increases in non-elective procedures for all age 
groups, although the effects are smallest for the elderly and largest for children.  The estimates 
imply that an increase of 100 foreclosures would increase non-elective visits by 8.2 percent 
among children, 4.3 percent among those aged 20-49, 5.9 percent among those aged 50-64, and 
by 1.1 percent among the elderly.   
The third column of Table 4 shows that there are large and significant impacts on 
preventable visits for all age groups, though again, the increases are smaller for the elderly than 
for other groups.    The difference between the effects on the elderly and the effects on those 
aged 50-64 suggests that while the elderly are not immune to the effects of the crisis, they are not 
suffering to the same extent as younger age groups.  This could be because of Medicare 
coverage, or it could reflect the fact that they are more likely to own homes “free and clear” and 
thus less likely to be “under water” on their mortgages than younger homeowners. 
Table 5 shows estimates of the effects of foreclosure on specific categories of visits.  As 
expected, there is no impact of foreclosure on our “control” category, cancer visits.   There is an 
impact on heart attack and stroke, but only among those aged 50-64.  It is not surprising that 
younger age groups are unaffected given the baseline concentration of visits for heart attack and 
stroke among older people.  However, all groups aged less than 65 see an increase in milder 
heart problems such as chest pain and dysrhythmias.  We also see significant increases in gastro-
intestinal problems and respiratory infections which are plausibly stress-related.   25 
 
We also find significant effects on mental health for those less than 65.  For example, an 
increase of 100 foreclosures would be associated with increases of 14.6 percent, 9.2 percent, and 
12.8 percent in visits for anxiety among those aged 50-64, 20-49, and 0-19, respectively.   The 
increases in visits related to suicide attempts are particularly striking, though they must be 
interpreted with some caution given the small baseline numbers of such visits.  Given that not 
every person with a mental health crisis presents at an ER or hospital, it appears that the 
foreclosure crisis may be taking a particularly heavy toll in terms of mental health.   
As mentioned above, there is good reason to expect larger effects of the foreclosure crisis 
on the health of blacks and Hispanics. Hence, we have estimated all of our models by age, race, 
and ethnicity. As shown in Table 6, the most striking finding is a much larger percentage 
increase in visits for Hispanics than for other groups. The difference is particularly pronounced 
among the elderly. Table 6 also illustrates the age profile noted above, with larger effects for the 
youngest people. This is however, not true for blacks, where visits for children seem to be 
relatively unaffected by the crisis. It is possible that black children have been largely cushioned 
from the medical effects of the crisis by eligibility for the Medicaid program.   
Turning to preventable visits, the most striking finding is again the much larger estimated 
impacts for Hispanics.  We have estimated models for each of the more detailed categories of 
conditions, and find that they generally follow a similar pattern.  Heart attacks and strokes are an 
exception, as we illustrate in Figure 4. The figure shows high impacts of foreclosures for blacks 
as well as for Hispanics. In fact, blacks aged 50-64 have the highest estimated percentage change 
in heart attack and stroke with foreclosures: Our estimates imply than an additional 100 
foreclosures in the average zip code would be associated with a 7.9 percent increase in heart 
attack or stroke in this group.  The 0-19 year old group is omitted from Figure 4 since they have 26 
 
few heart attacks or strokes This analysis suggests that minorities really have been at double 
jeopardy in the foreclosure crisis – both more likely to live in highly impacted zip codes, and 
more likely to suffer ill health as a result. 
Table 7 examines the effects of the foreclosure crisis on those with private health 
insurance.  We do not include the elderly in this table since most of the elderly are covered by 
Medicare.  The composition of the privately insured may be changing if, for example, financial 
distress causes homeowners to drop insurance coverage; if those losing insurance are likely to be 
sicker in any case (at least within age categories) then composition effects would cause us to see 
decreases rather than increases in privately insured visits.  Still, within the privately insured 
sample, we find significant positive effects on visits in each age category.   In the 50-64 year old 
group, we find positive effects on total non-elective visits, preventable visits, and on 
gastrointestinal problems, and upper respiratory infections.  Among 20-49 year olds, and among 
children there are significant negative effects on elective visits (which are suggestive of financial 
constraints) and positive effects on upper respiratory infections and suicides.   Among children, 
there are also significant positive effects on non-elective visits.  These estimates suggest that 
even those who retain private health insurance are not immune from the negative health effects 
of the foreclosure crisis though those without health insurance or more adversely affected. 
Table 8 shows several alternative specifications for   a representative group of the 
conditions discussed above, and for two age groups, those aged 20-49 and 50-64.   Panels 1 and 
2 show estimates for 2005 through 2007 only.   As shown in Figure 1, unemployment did not 
start its sharp rise until 2008.  Table 7 shows that we still find large increases in visits in this time 
period, though some of our estimates are less precisely estimated given that the sample has been 
cut in half.  Panels 3 and 4 present estimates of the effect of foreclosure using county level data.  27 
 
The models include county fixed effects and an indicator for each year*quarter as well as the 
unemployment rate.  We find positive and statistically significant effects of foreclosures on 
visits, though the implied percentage changes are about half as big as in the zip code level 
models.
17  Hence, using county level data attenuates, but does not eliminate the estimated effects 
of foreclosure.  Unemployment is also estimated to increase hospital and ER visits for some 
conditions, though it is less consistently associated with higher visit levels than foreclosures.   
We have also estimated models further exploring the relationship between foreclosure 
and unemployment by including interactions between the unemployment rate and the number of 
foreclosures.  Because unemployment is available only at the county level, the main effect of 
unemployment is absorbed by the county*year*quarter effects included in these, as in all of our 
models.   Estimates from these models are shown in Appendix Table 1.  The implied percent 
change in visits is shown for two different levels of unemployment that roughly bracket the 
range of our data: 5 percent and 10 percent.  The percent changes are positive (except for suicide 
when unemployment is 5 percent), and the estimated percent change when unemployment is 10 
percent is strikingly similar to what we see in our main specifications.  Thus, these estimates 
suggest that while foreclosure and unemployment have separate impacts, the impact of 
foreclosure is worse when unemployment is high, as one might expect if both capture different 
types of financial distress. 
Table 9 shows estimates from models that add zip code level measures of housing prices 
and vacancies.  Adding these variables reduces the estimated impact of foreclosure only slightly.  
For example, among those aged 20-49 year olds, the implied percent change in non-elective 
                                                           
17 There are approximately 20 times as many foreclosures in the county than in the zip code.  To take 20-
49 year olds for example, the zip code level analysis implies that 100 foreclosures would increase non-
elective visits by 4.3%.  The county level analysis implies that 2,000 foreclosures would increase non-
elective visits by about 2%.  
 28 
 
visits with an additional 100 foreclosures falls from 4.3 percent to 4.1 percent.    Higher housing 
prices have generally negative effects on the number of visits, though there is an anomalous 
positive estimated effect of housing prices on suicides. 
All of these measures, the number of foreclosures, the number of REOs, the Zillow 
housing price measure, and the post office’s measure of vacancies, can be viewed as imperfect 
indicators of the value of the housing stock in the neighborhood.  We believe that the reason that 
adding housing prices and vacancies to the models has little impact on the estimated effect of 
foreclosure is that most of the relevant information about property values is captured by the 
foreclosure and REO variables, as well as by the zip code fixed effects and the indicators for 
county*year*quarter.   In particular, measured housing prices may be a relatively poor way to 
track housing values in neighborhoods where few houses are selling. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
This study examines the effects of the foreclosure crisis in order to shed light on the 
health effects of financial distress.  Our results suggest that individuals in communities that have 
suffered high rates of foreclosure are more likely to seek treatment in hospitals and emergency 
rooms for a variety of stress-related conditions such as mental health conditions, heart attack and 
stroke, as well as for conditions that could be prevented by appropriate care such as 
hospitalizations for hypertension.   
The estimated effects differ strongly by race and by age:  The foreclosure crisis is having 
its most harmful effects on those younger than age 65 and on minorities, especially Hispanics, 
though blacks aged 50 to 65 experience the largest increase in visits for heart attack and stroke of 
any group.  These effects cannot be attributed solely to the increase in unemployment, or to 29 
 
individuals switching from outpatient to hospital settings.  Our results do suggest however, that 
insurance coverage is protective (though this may be in part because those who retain insurance 
coverage are less likely to be in financial distress).  
Our estimates imply that the 2.82 million foreclosures in 2009 led to 4.18 million 
additional non-elective hospital and ER visits among those aged less than 65.  While the cost 
data available from HCUP is imperfect and covers only hospital costs, a crude cost analysis 
suggests that non-elective visits impose a cost of an average of $2,521 (in 2009 dollars).  Thus, 
additional visits due to foreclosure cost in excess of $10.5 billion in 2009 alone.
 18     
Taken together, these results highlight an important consequence of the foreclosure crisis 
that has not received much attention from policy-makers.    They suggest that measures to keep 
individuals in their homes are likely to improve health only to the extent that they stabilize 
neighborhoods and ameliorate financial distress among not only those being foreclosed, but 
among their neighbors. 
   
                                                           
18 HCUP data cost data do not include physician costs, which are usually billed separately.  Other 
limitations are that cost data are not available for ER visits in California, so that we had to exclude CA 
from our calculations of the average cost of a visit.  Also, data are presented in terms of “total charges,” 
essentially a list price which few people pay, and “cost-to-charge” ratios (CCR) for the hospital or for 
groups of hospitals.  One must multiply the total charge by the CCR in order to approximate the actual 
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Appendix: Aggregating CCS Single‐Diagnosis Codes 
 
We exclude induced abortion (178), normal pregnancy and delivery (196), live born (218), 
and contraception, complications of pregnancy/abortion (codes 176‐195). 
 
1)   Infectious Disease – codes 1‐10 
2)   Cancer and Benign Neoplasms– codes 11‐45, 46‐47 
3)   Diabetes‐codes 49,50 
4)   Other Endocrine/Metabolic disorders – codes 48, 51‐58 
5)   Hematologic Disorders, disorders of veins ‐‐ codes 59‐64, 188‐121 
6)   Anxiety related Mental Health‐codes 651, 657, 660‐661 
7)   Suicide‐code 662 
8)   All other mental health‐codes 650, 652‐656, 658, 659, 663, 670 
9)   Headache‐code 84 
10) Other Central Nervous System‐codes 76‐83, 85, 95 
11) Eye and Ear‐code 86‐94 
12) Heart Attack and Stroke‐code 97, 100, 101, 103, 104, 107‐117 
13) Heart valve disorders, Nonspecific Chest Pain, Conduction Disorders, Dysrhthmias– 
code 96, 102, 105, 106 
14) Hypertension – code 98, 99 
15) Upper Resp. Infection (Pneumonia, Influenza, Tonsillitis, Bronchitis, Other)‐code 
122‐126 
16) Other Resp. excluding Asthma‐code 127, 129‐134 
17) Asthma‐code 128 
18) Gastrointestinal including appendicitis‐code 135‐155 
19) Kidney and Urinary Tract (including urinary tract infections)‐code 156‐163 
20)  Genital disorders (including inflammation and menstrual disorders)‐code 164‐175 
21) Skin infections, inflammatory conditions, ulcers, other skin‐code 197‐200 
22)  Bone disease and musculoskeletal disease (including arthritis, lupus)‐code 201‐212 
23)  Injuries‐code 225‐244 
24)  Malaise (Miscellaneous symptoms including Fever of unknown origin, 
lymphadenitis, nausea, abdominal pain, malaise, allergic reactions)‐code 245‐253 
25) Other (including rehabilitation care, social admissions, medical evaluation, 
unclassified)‐code 254‐259 
 
See http://www.hcup‐us.ahrq.gov/toolssoftware/ccs/AppendixASingleDX.txt for a complete list 
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HispanicTable 1: Characteristics of Those With and Without Foreclosure (PSID)
2009 2009 2009
Never Ever No Current Own, No 2009
Foreclosure Foreclosure Foreclosure Foreclosure Mortgage Rent
Age 20-49 0.490 0.648 0.515 0.489 0.140 0.668
Age 50-64 0.285 0.277 0.358 0.422 0.314 0.188
65 and over 0.222 0.075 0.127 0.090 0.546 0.138
Non-Hispanic White 0.744 0.651 0.788 0.693 0.849 0.620
African American 0.145 0.197 0.094 0.171 0.072 0.252
Hispanic 0.086 0.129 0.087 0.136 0.058 0.108
Head Unemployed 0.070 0.107 0.045 0.159 0.028 0.105
Married 0.473 0.431 0.675 0.470 0.564 0.203
Children Under 18 0.287 0.506 0.396 0.463 0.128 0.279
Health is Excellent 0.178 0.095 0.214 0.059 0.131 0.159
Health is Poor 0.052 0.073 0.025 0.109 0.082 0.058
Head Smokes 0.197 0.315 0.147 0.218 0.134 0.285
Head Drinks 0.650 0.609 0.710 0.631 0.561 0.637
Doctor Ever Told:
Stroke 0.043 0.030 0.026 0.060 0.056 0.052
Heart Attack 0.053 0.088 0.035 0.186 0.129 0.036
Heart Disease 0.070 0.067 0.050 0.130 0.136 0.052
Hypertension 0.345 0.318 0.322 0.112 0.498 0.286
Asthma 0.109 0.108 0.091 0.102 0.092 0.139
Diabetes 0.108 0.146 0.097 0.133 0.144 0.095
Cancer 0.081 0.067 0.065 0.140 0.164 0.054
Psychological Problem 0.092 0.160 0.058 0.222 0.055 0.152
Number of Observations 8,355 327 3445 41 1,204 3,273
Notes: Means are weighted using the 2009 PSID sample weights.   Sample in the first two columns includes people
for whom the date of foreclosure is missing.Table 2: Zipcode Means by Rate of Foreclosure in 2009
Zips in Top 5th Zips in Bottom 5th
All Zipcodes Foreclosures, 2009 Foreclosures, 2009
Number of foreclosures 2009 90.83 201.01 4.74
(92.92) (108.95) (4.19)
Number of foreclosures 2005 6.89 13.35 1.29
(10.75) (15.59) (1.87)
Number REO 2009 44.38 103.67 2.50
(49.44) (61.99) (2.31)
Number REO 2005 1.66 2.08 0.65
(3.58) (2.62) (0.82)
Characteristics of Zip Codes in 2000
   Mean population 35536.39 36384.89 24735.81
(19637.08) (18697.43) (17974.38)
   Median Income 48013.64 43608.43 63985.20
(18845.12) (13504.4) (26638.31)
   Percent Black 9.7 11.1 6.0
(14.7) (14.7) (9.6)
   Percent Hispanic 32.3 34.3 10.8
(23.3) (18.0) (14.3)
   Percent Over 65 12.9 11.7 13.5
(7.9) (7.7) (7.7)
   Poverty Rate 13.1 14.0 8.9
(8.9) (8.2) (10.4)
Notes: All means are weighted using population from the 2000 U.S. Census.  Characteristics of zip
codes also come from the 2000 U.S. Census.  Data on house prices comes from Zillow.  
Data on vacancies are from the U.S. postal service and includes properties marked as vacant more
than 90 days by mail carriers.
N=3,525 zip codes (ZCTAs).
Standard deviations are in parentheses.Table 3: Number of Hospitalizations and ER Visits by Type, and High or Low Foreclosure Zip Code
All Zips Zips in Top 5th Zips in Bottom 5th
Foreclosures in 2009 Foreclosures in 2009
Visits for Elective Procedures 154.58 158.59 108.59
Total Non-Elective  3020.75 3637.57 1590.00
Preventable Visits 281.79 344.93 143.98
Selected Categories of Non-Elective Visits
Cancer and Neoplasms 25.11 26.45 15.79
Gastrointestinal 241.29 288.08 126.13
Heart Attack and Stroke 105.45 115.64 69.64
Chest Pain, Dysrythmias,  127.17 151.34 73.09
  and Conduction Disorders
Hypertension 23.24 27.88 10.99
Upper Respiratory Infection  228.72 295.94 94.78
Anxiety 79.86 86.53 45.38
Suicide Attempt 0.87 1.19 0.27
Notes:  Newborns and deliveries are excluded from the sample.  Means are weighted by zip code 




Effect of Foreclosures 0.0122* 0.0719* 0.0103*
(0.006) (0.023) (0.006)
Effect of REOs -0.002 0.0527* 0.0091
(0.006) (0.024) (0.007)
Number Visits 84.49 647.78 99.97
% Change 0.0144% 0.0111% 0.0103%
Age: 50-64
Effect of Foreclosures 0.0058* 0.2390* 0.0273*
(0.003) (0.024) (0.004)
Effect of REOs 0.0049 0.2118* 0.0274*
(0.00) (0.03) (0.01)
Number Visits 37.1 405.55 43.09
% Change  0.0156% 0.0589% 0.0634%
Age: 20-49
Effect of Foreclosures -0.0052* 0.5275* 0.0471*
(0.003) (0.052) (0.006)
Effect of REOs -0.0038 0.2707* 0.0327*
(0.003) (0.056) (0.007)
Number Visits 35.57 1227.05 81.69
% Change -0.0141% 0.0430% 0.0577%
Age: 0-19
Effect of Foreclosures -0.0014 0.7193* 0.0437*
(0.001) (0.072) (0.009)
Effect of REOs 0.0009 0.3136* 0.0301*
(0.002) (0.093) (0.012)
Number Visits 7.73 874.01 68.32
% Change  -0.0129% 0.0823% 0.0640%
Notes: 
Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level and shown in parentheses.  An asterisk indicates 
statistical significance at the 95% level of confidence.
Bold type indicates that the estimated effect used to compute the percent change is statistically
significant.
All regressions control for zip code fixed effects, number of real-estate owned properties, and for 
county*quarter*year effects.  Regressions are weighted using 2000 zip code population.Table 5: Effects of Foreclosure on Specific Categories of Non-Elective Visits
Gastro- Heart Attack Chest  Hyper- Upper 
Cancer Intestinal or Stroke pain, etc. tension Resp. Inf. Anxiety Suicide
Age: 65+
Effect of Foreclosures 0.0013 0.0033 0.0013 0.0030 0.0018 0.0083* 0.0006 -0.0002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000)
Effect of REOs -0.0015 -0.0004 -0.0078 0.0028 0.0012 0.0120* 0.0011 0.0003*
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000)
Number Visits 12.84 57.58 75.59 44.13 10.2 27.03 9.56 0.05
%Change  0.0101% 0.0057% 0.0017% 0.0068% 0.0176% 0.0307% 0.0063% 0.0000%
Age: 50-64
Effect of Foreclosures 0.0004 0.0174* 0.0066* 0.0189* 0.0044* 0.0180* 0.0193* 0.0004*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000)
Effect of REOs 0.0012 .0171* -0.0035 0.178* .0034* 0.0193* .0079* 0.0004*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000)
Number Visits 6.22 34.47 24.38 29.77 6.24 14.81 13.25 0.12
%Change  0.0064% 0.0505% 0.0271% 0.0635% 0.0705% 0.1215% 0.1457% 0.3333%
Age: 20-49
Effect of Foreclosures 0.0001 0.0505* -0.0005 0.0306* 0.0039* 0.0921* 0.0428* 0.0021*
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.013) (0.006) (0.000)
Effect of REOs 0.0019 0.0133* -0.0003 0.115* .0039* 0.0867* 0.0069 0.005
(0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.018) (0.006) (0.000)
Number Visits 5.77 97.77 12.57 51.46 6.88 62.39 46.76 0.52
%Change  0.0017% 0.0517% 0.0000% 0.0595% 0.0567% 0.1476% 0.0915% 0.4038%
Age: 0-19
Effect of Foreclosures 0.0006 0.0062 -0.0001 0.0042* -0.0003 0.2580* 0.0138* 0.0008*
(0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.037) (0.002) (0.000)
Effect of REOs -0.0001 0.0078 0.0003 0.0051* 0.0004 0.1381* 0.0044 0.0026
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.048) (0.003) (0.002)
Number Visits 1.45 62.58 1.01 6.77 0.19 140.6 10.76 0.20
%Change  0.0414% 0.0099% 0.0000% 0.0620% 0.0000% 0.1835% 0.1283% 0.4000%Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level.  T-statistics shown in parentheses.  An asterisk indicates 
statistical significance at the 95% level of confidence.
Bold type indicates that the estimated effect used to compute the percent change is statistically significant.
All regressions control for zip code fixed effects, number of real-estate owned properties, and for county*quarter*year effects.
Regressions are weighted using 2000 zip code population.Table 6: Effects of Foreclosure by Race and Ethnicity
Black Hispanic White
Black Non Black Hispanic Non Hispanic White Non White
Elective Elective Preventable Elective Elective Preventable Elective Elective Preventable
Age: 65+
Foreclosures -0.0002 0.0006 0.0001 0.0104* 0.1460* 0.0228* 0.0037 -0.1379 -0.0182
(0.004) (0.026) (0.013) (0.004) (0.040) (0.008) (0.006) (0.111) (0.012)
REO -0.0052 0.0671* 0.0063 -0.0047 -0.0121 -0.0054 0.0020 0.0005 0.0118
(0.006) (0.021) (0.008) (0.004) (0.041) (0.009) (0.005) (0.036) (0.007)
Number Visits 17.00 202.81 39.05 23.4 229.02 41.13 61.46 455.09 71.24
% Change 0.0000% 0.0003% 0.0003% 0.0444% 0.0637% 0.0554% 0.0000% -0.0301% -0.0253%
Age: 50-64
Foreclosures 0.0027 0.1091* 0.0203* 0.0028* 0.1635* 0.0185* 0.0035 0.1491* 0.0164*
(0.003) (0.039) (0.007) (0.002) (0.020) (0.003) (0.003) (0.023) (0.004)
REO -0.0006 0.0919* 0.0014 -0.0003 0.0629* 0.0088* 0.0005 0.1475* 0.0155*
(0.003) (0.030) (0.006) (0.002) (0.026) (0.004) (0.003) (0.019) (0.003)
Number Visits 13.14 247.6 35.12 10.82 166.65 19.46 26.38 243.45 23.61
% Change 0.0205% 0.0441% 0.0578% 0.0259% 0.0981% 0.0951% 0.0133% 0.0612% 0.0695%
Age: 20-49
Foreclosures -0.0010 0.2267* 0.0190* 0.0016 0.6224* 0.0506* -0.0029 0.4748* 0.0314*
(0.003) (0.064) (0.007) (0.002) (0.071) (0.006) (0.002) (0.076) (0.005)
REO -0.0043 0.2319* 0.0251* -0.0018 0.2679* 0.0196* 0.008* 0.2058* 0.0226*
(0.003) (0.055) (0.009) (0.002) (0.080) (0.007) (0.002) (0.062) (0.006)
Number Visits 15.06 690.84 54.81 12.57 579.81 40.3 20.38 609.16 36.31
% Change -0.0066% 0.0328% 0.0347% 0.0127% 0.1073% 0.1256% -0.0098% 0.0779% 0.0865%
Age: 0-19
Foreclosures -0.0019* 0.1209* 0.0076 -0.0004 0.9825* 0.0680* -0.0002 0.5417* 0.0367*
(0.001) (0.041) (0.006) (0.002) (0.112) (0.010) (0.001) (0.095) (0.007)
REO 0.0008 0.1283* 0.0076 0.0014 0.4097* 0.0359* 0.0006 0.2153* 0.0160*
(0.001) (0.036) (0.006) (0.002) (0.107) (0.011) (0.001) (0.055) (0.005)
Number Visits 3.2 445.49 38.55 4.35 644.15 50.96 3.81 324.33 22.61
% Change -0.0600% 0.0271% 0.0197% 0.0000% 0.1525% 0.1334% 0.0000% 0.1670% 0.1623%Notes: Only zip codes for CA, NJ and FL are included. AZ does not identify race and ethnicity.  Standard errors are clustered at the zip code 
level and shown in parentheses.  An asterisk indicates statistical significance at the 95% level of confidence.  Bold type indicates that the
estimated effect used to compute the percent change is statistically significant.  All regressions control for zip code fixed effects, number of 
real-estate owned properties, and for county*quarter*year effects.  Regressions are weighted using 2000 zip code population.Table 7: Effects of Foreclosure on the Privately Insured
Non- Gastro- AMI Chest  Hyper- Upper 
Elective Elective Preventable Intestinal or Stroke pain, etc. tension Resp. Inf. Suicide
Age: 50-64
Foreclosures 0.0025 0.0356* 0.0051* 0.0034* -0.0002 0.0011 0.0005 0.0067* 0.0001
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
REO 0.0032 0.0307* 0.0026 0.0029 0.0002 0.0088* 0.0003 0.0028 0.0000
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Mean #Visits (Priv. Ins.) 24.05 181.07 15.97 16.69 11.32 16.46 2.46 6.32 0.048
% Change 0.0104% 0.0197% 0.0319% 0.0204% 0.0000% 0.0067% 0.0203% 0.1060% 0.2083%
Age: 20-49
Foreclosures -0.0037* -0.0229 -0.0023 -0.0016 -0.0015 0.0012 0.0000 0.0148* 0.0004*
(0.002) (0.025) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000)
REO -0.0022 -0.0488 0.0041 -0.0011 0.001 0.0022 0.0006 0.0169* 0.0003
(0.003) (0.023) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
Mean #Visits (Priv. Ins.) 21.84 456.71 29.21 37.54 5.17 24.71 2.38 22.59 0.166
% Change -0.0169% -0.0050% -0.0079% -0.0043% -0.0290% 0.0049% 0.0000% 0.0655% 0.2410%
Age: 0-19
Foreclosures -0.0017 0.0870* 0.0047 -0.0042 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0436* 0.0003*
(0.001) (0.038) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000)
REO 0.0009 0.0016 0.0004 -0.0034 -0.0001 0.0010 0.0000 0.0292** -0.0001
(0.001) (0.032) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000)
Mean #Visits (County) 3.70 319.41 24.62 22.65 0.41 3.04 0.06 40.63 0.11
% Change -0.0270% 0.0272% 0.0191% -0.0177% 0.0000% 0.0099% 0.0000% 0.1073% 0.2727%
Number of Observations 63,450 63,450 63,450 63,450 63,450 63,450 63,450 63,450 63,450
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level  and shown in parentheses.  An asterisk indicates statistical significance 
at the 95% level of confidence.
Bold type indicates that the estimated coefficient used to compute the percent change is statistically significant.
Regressions are weighted using 2000 zip code population.Table 8: Alternative Specifications
Non- Gastro- AMI Chest  Hyper- Upper 
Elective Elective Preventable Intestinal or Stroke pain, etc. tension Resp. Inf. Suicide
Models Estimated Over 2005-2007: Age 50-64
Foreclosures -0.0021 0.2032* 0.0204* 0.0172* 0.0033 0.0044 0.0030 0.0048 0.0006*
(0.007) (0.036) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.000)
REO 0.0139* 0.055 0.0199* 0.0005 0.0062 0.0237* 0.0018 0.0132 -0.0005
(0.008) (0.048) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.001)
Mean #Visits (Zip) 37.1 405.55 43.09 34.47 24.38 29.77 6.24 14.82 0.12
% Change -0.0054% 0.0501% 0.0473% 0.0499% 0.0135% 0.0148% 0.0481% 0.0324% 0.5000%
Models Estimated Over 2005-2007: Age 20-49
Foreclosures -0.0102 0.3889* 0.0188 0.0799* 0.0003 0.0181* 0.0094* -0.0076 -0.0003
(0.007) (0.110) (0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.017) (0.001)
REO 0.0144 0.1752 0.0179 -0.0079 0.0008 0.0081 -0.0014 0.037 0.0009
(0.010) (0.119) (0.020) (0.016) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.028) (0.001)
Mean #Visits (Zip) 35.57 1227.05 81.69 97.77 12.57 51.46 6.88 62.39 0.52
% Change -0.0281% 0.0317% 0.0230% 0.0817% 0.0024% 0.0352% 0.1366% -0.0112% 0.0000%
County Level Models: Age 50-64
Foreclosures -0.0194 0.3712* 0.0374* 0.0235* 0.001 0.022 0.0077* 0.024 0.0027*
-0.014 -0.124 -0.017 -0.008 (0.005) -0.014 -0.002 -0.017 (0.000)
REO 0.0154* 0.5156* 0.0397* 0.0531* 0.0099* 0.0778* 0.0008 0.0316* 0.0000
(0.008) (0.147) (0.007) (0.018) (0.002) (0.025) (0.003) (0.008) (0.000)
Unemployment Rate -18.64 134.01 28.69 9.29 5.76 16.15 6.16* 21.82 -0.381
(14.18) (186.75) (21.16) (14.58) (5.06) (20.94) (2.85) (21.63) (0.455)
Mean #Visits (County) 2136 24178 2625 2068 1413 1759 387 838 7.75
% Change -0.0009% 0.0015% 0.0014% 0.0011% 0.0001% 0.0013% 0.0020% 0.0029% 0.0348%
County Level Models: Age 20-49
Foreclosures 0.0426* 0.7334* 0.0656* 0.0707* -0.0013 0.0499* 0.0047* 0.1447* 0.0110*
-0.089 -0.199 -0.014 (0.008) (0.002) -0.015 (0.001) -0.064 (0.000)
REO -0.0225 0.0933* 0.0094 0.0099 -0.0095 0.0299* -0.001 0.0686* -0.003
(0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.015) (0.004) (0.015) (0.003) (0.014) (0.001)
Unemployment Rate -15.85 476.01 60.33* 744.66* 1.44 27.06 5.75* 131.86 -2.51
(29.26) (316.19) (28.02) (155.11) (3.47) (27.18) (2.51) (98.45) (1.55)Mean #Visits (County) 2212 71879 4849 569 758 3126 398 3384 34
% Change 0.0019% 0.0010% 0.0014% 0.0124% -0.0001% 0.0016% 0.0012% 0.0043% 0.0324%
Number of Observations 35,250 35,250 35,250 35,250 35,250 35,250 35,250 35,250 35,250
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level  and shown in parentheses.  An asterisk indicates 
statistical significance at the 95% level of confidence.
Bold type indicates that the estimated coefficient used to compute the percent change is statistically significant.
County-level models include county and year fixed effects and the number of real-estate owned properties.
Regressions are weighted using 2000 zip code population.Table 9: Controlling for Housing Prices and Vacancies
Non- Gastro- AMI Chest  Hyper- Upper 
Elective Elective Preventable Intestinal or Stroke pain, etc. tension Resp. Inf. Suicide
Age:20-49
Foreclosures -0.0029 0.5005* 0.0463* 0.0441* 0.0001 0.0271* 0.0029* 0.0902* 0.0017*
(0.003) (0.050) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.013) (0.000)
REO -0.0001 0.1897* 0.0263* 0.0037 -0.0001 0.0087* 0.0029 0.0798* 0.0000
(0.003) (0.053) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.018) (0.000)
Housing Price ($1000s) 0.0049* -0.1320* -0.0085* -0.0052 -0.0020 -0.0045 0.0004 -0.0182* 0.0008*
(0.002) (0.047) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000)
Vacancies -0.0017* 0.0494* 0.0052* 0.0053* 0.0001 0.0033* 0.0011* 0.0081* 0.0007*
(0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Mean #Visits (Zip) 35.57 1227.05 81.69 97.77 12.57 51.46 6.88 62.39 0.52
% Change -0.0056% 0.0408% 0.0567% 0.0451% 0.0008% 0.0527% 0.0422% 0.1446% 0.3269%
# Obs. 43,006 43,006 43,006 43,006 43,006 43,006 43,006 43,006 43,006
Age: 50-64
Foreclosures 0.0059* 0.2220* 0.0266* 0.0143* 0.0075* 0.0176* 0.0043* 0.0180* 0.0003
(0.003) (0.021) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000)
REO 0.0036 0.1483* 0.0217* 0.0112* -0.0044* 0.0128* 0.0018 0.0185* 0.0003
(0.003) (0.032) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000)
Housing Price ($1000s) 0.0033 -0.0018 -0.0024 -0.0039* -0.0012 0.0012 0.0015 -0.0024 0.0003*
(0.002) (0.017) (0.002) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.0001)
Vacancies 0.0007 0.0373* 0.0038* 0.0024* -0.0004 0.0022* 0.0011* 0.0011* 0.0002*
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean #Visits (Zip) 37.1 405.55 43.09 34.47 24.38 29.77 6.24 14.82 0.12
% Change 0.0159% 0.0547% 0.0617% 0.0415% 0.0308% 0.0591% 0.0689% 0.1215% 0.2500%
Number of Observations 43,006 43,006 43,006 43,006 43,006 43,006 43,006 43,006 43,006
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level  and shown in parentheses.  
An asterisk indicates statistical significance at the 95% level of confidence.
Bold type indicates that the estimated coefficient used to compute the percent change is statistically significant.
All regressions except the county-level control for zip code fixed effects, number of real-estate owned properties, and for county*quarter*year effects.
County-level models include county and year fixed effects and the number of real-estate owned properties.
Percent changes are calculated using most recently given means in all cases. Regressions are weighted using 2000 zip code population.Appendix Table 1: Interactions of Foreclosure and Unemployment
Non- Gastro- AMI Chest  Hyper- Upper 
Elective Elective PQI Intestinal or Stroke pain, etc. tension Resp. Inf. Suicide
Age: 20-49
Foreclosures -0.0008 0.0785* 0.0066* 0.0048* -0.0000 0.0033* 0.0006* 0.0203* 0.0006*
  * UR (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Foreclosures 0.0031 -0.2435* -0.0179 0.0032 -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0021 -0.1072* -0.0036*
(0.006) (0.124) (0.015) (0.014) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.026) (0.001)
REO -0.0043 0.3231* 0.0371* 0.0165* -0.004 0.0136* 0.0043* 0.1003* 0.0009*
(0.003) (0.058) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.017) (0.000)
Mean #Visits (Zip) 35.57 1227.05 81.69 97.77 12.57 51.46 6.88 62.39 0.52
%Change, UR=10 -0.0138% 0.0441% 0.0589% 0.0524% -0.0040% 0.0614% 0.0567% 0.1536% 0.4615%
%Change, UR=5 -0.0025% 0.0121% 0.0185% 0.0278% -0.0040% 0.0293% 0.0131% 0.0125% -0.1154%
Age: 50-64
Foreclosures 0.0006 0.0322* 0.0035* 0.0023* -0.0006 0.0021* 0.0008* 0.0032* 0.0001*
  * UR (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Foreclosures -0.0003 -0.0780 -0.0071 -0.0054 0.0124* -0.0016 -0.0033 -0.0132* -0.0010**
(0.006) (0.052) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.000)
REO 0.0053* 0.2310* 0.0295* 0.0184* -0.0038 0.0191* 0.0039* 0.0212* 0.0005*
(0.003) (0.034) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000)
Mean #Visits (Zip) 37.1 405.55 43.09 34.47 24.38 29.77 6.24 14.82 0.12
%Change, UR=10 0.0154% 0.0602% 0.0647% 0.0511% 0.0263% 0.0652% 0.0753% 0.1269% 0.0000%
%Change, UR=5 0.0073% 0.0205% 0.0241% 0.0177% 0.0008% 0.0299% 0.0112% 0.0081% -0.4167%
Number of Observations 63,450 63,450 63,450 63,450 63,450 63,450 63,450 63,450 63,450
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the zip code level  and shown in parentheses.  An asterisk indicates 
statistical significance at the 95% level of confidence.
Bold type indicates that the estimated coefficient used to compute the percent change is statistically significant.
All regressions control for zip code fixed effects, number of real-estate owned properties, and for county*quarter*year effects.
Percent changes are calculated using most recently given means in all cases.
Regressions are weighted using 2000 zip code population.